新墨西哥大学周凌教授学术讲座

The issuer-pay model of major credit rating agencies has long been criticized for its potential to create conflicts of interest and inflated ratings. We provide evidence that rating inflation affects the design of private loan contracts. We find that lenders are less likely to grant performance-sensitive debt indexed to credit ratings (rating-based PSD) when issuer-paid ratings are inflated. Furthermore, difference-in-differences analysis indicates that rating-based PSD is more likely after an exogenous shock that decreases the inflation of issuer-paid ratings. In response to rating inflation, the lender increases monitoring efforts by relying on performance covenants. Consistent with increased monitoring and renegotiation costs, interest spreads are higher for borrowers with inflated ratings. We further document an effect on other important contract terms. Our evidence is consistent with lenders adjusting different contract terms to compensate for monitoring deficiencies associated with inflated credit ratings. 周凌教授本科毕业于清华大学管理学院，2004年获得耶鲁大学会计学博士学位。2004-2012在美国杜兰大学任助理教授，2012开始在新墨西哥大学任职，现为新墨西哥大学安德森管理学院正教授，会计系系主任。研究方向主要为资本市场实证研究，曾在Review of Accounting Studies, Contemporary Accounting Research, Journal of Corporate Finance, Auditing: A Journal of Practice and Theory 等期刊上发表论文。现为Advances in Accounting和International Journal of Accounting and Information Management的编委，美国会计学会国际会计部会员委员会联席主席，曾任美国会计学会年会国际会计部分会主席。